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Introduction
People's attitudes toward risk and uncertainty are an important subject of economic theory because these attitudes are vital in shaping individual behavior in many markets. Indeed, the very existence of several markets, in particular insurance markets, is a consequence of such preferences as these markets are valuable in allowing to achieve a superior allocation of risk between market participants with varying risk preferences (Borch 1962; Gollier 1992) .
It is standard to assume that economic agents have risk-averse preferences, i.e., that they prefer a lottery's expected value over the lottery itself. This assumption is typically justied with the plausibility of assuming diminishing marginal utility of wealth. Despite this, it is long known that indivisibilities in consumption can motivate risk-seeking behavior. Building on prior work by Ng (1965) , Jones (2008) , and Vasquez (2017) I investigate people's risk attitudes if wealth can be allocated into divisible and indivisible consumption opportunities. I extend this prior work by allowing indivisible consumption opportunities to vary across states of nature.
State-dependent indivisibilities in consumption result in a state-dependent indirect utility function of wealth. In general, people cannot be classied as risk-averse, -neutral, or -seeking anymore. This is due to the fact that an individual's risk attitudes are no longer depending only on the moments of a distribution. Instead, the identity of the states, in which dierent payos occur, matters. In addition, indivisibilities result in the marginal utility of wealth to dier across states even if the utility from divisible consumption is identical across states. Hence, state-dependent indivisibilities can be the root cause of a previously identied source of state-dependence: dierences in marginal utility of wealth across states. However, indivisibilities in consumption also mean that the (state-dependent) marginal utility of wealth is less informative about people's risk attitudes. I argue that instead of redening the notion of risk in a setting with state-dependent preferences (Karni 1985) , we need to understand the new motives that state-dependence produces for gambling and insurance. In particular, insurance is no longer valuable only to reduce risk exposure. Instead, the major purpose of insurance is to allow a targeted redistribution of wealth across states of nature to address conditional needs.
As before, this can be valuable to redistribute wealth from states with lower marginal utility to states with higher marginal utility of wealth (consumption smoothing). I investigate how indivisible consumption opportunities create a consumptionsmoothing motive in insurance that is distinct from the classic consumption-smoothing motive in response to potential losses. In addition to consumption-smoothing, insurance is valuable to realize indivisible consumption opportunities that are otherwise either not feasible (compare the access motive of Nyman 1999) or only desirable if nanced across states. I investigate the conditions under which this access motive (Nyman 1999) dominates the consumption-smoothing motive. The distinction between dierent motives for insurance is of particular relevance in insurance contexts that are not (primarily) characterized by nancial losses but specic needs, such as health, long-term care, or longevity insurance.
Gambling, in contrast to insurance, is valuable for optimally allocating wealth into indivisible consumption opportunities that are state-independent (Ng 1965; Jones 2008; Vasquez 2017) . Notably, this understanding of insurance and gambling views the two activities no longer as opposites. Instead, these activities have a far more complex relationship, sometimes complementing each other, sometimes being imperfect (or even perfect) substitutes.
The separation of insurance motives from risk aversion and the insight that the latter constitutes an exception rather than the rule have important implications for both policy and research. First, policy recommendations with regard to the optimal design of insurance assume almost exclusively that insurance derives its value from consumption-smoothing. These recommendations can change fundamentally if other motives are accounted for (Fels 2016) . In addition, measures of risk preferences 6 derived from insurance choices cannot be generalized beyond the context in which they are derived since they incorporate the specic conditional needs that these insurances address. On the positive side, this means that the common nding of diering risk attitudes across context or time does not need to be a sign of unstable preferences (Barseghyan et al. 2011; Schildberg-Hörisch 2018) but of diering conditional needs.
On the other hand, risk attitudes derived in one context might have little value informing insurance design in other contexts. Similarly, risk attitudes derived in a laboratory setting might have limited value in informing actual insurance policy as the former abstracts from the conditional needs that govern actual insurance choices.
The paper proceeds as follows. After introducing the analysis of indivisible consumption opportunities in a simple framework close to Vasquez (2017) in section 2, I investigate the implications of allowing these opportunities to dier across states in section 3. In particular, I discuss the dierent role of insurance and gambling in a context of state-dependent preferences. Furthermore, I present dierent cases suggesting a far more complex relationship between these two behaviors than only being mere opposites: being complements in some cases, while being (im)perfect substitutes in others. In section 4, I concentrate on the functions of insurance. For this purpose, I assume utility from divisible consumption to take the popular concave functional form. Specically, I investigate two roles of insurance, consumption-smoothing and access provision, and their relative contribution to an insurance value. I conclude with a short discussion of the implications for policy and research. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Preliminaries
Suppose that an individual can divide his wealth w between consumption opportunities that are perfectly divisible and consumption opportunities that are indivisible.
Let the (indirect) utility from consuming divisible consumption opportunities be described by a utility function
, where w d denotes the share of wealth allocated to divisible consumption. Suppose that, in addition, there is a nite list I of indivisible consumption items that are each described by a cost c i and utility v i . Following Vasquez (2017) , I dene the utility density of an item i ∈ I as d i = v i /c i and make the following assumption:
Let the vector a = (a i ) i∈I of 0s and 1s denote the decision which indivisible consumption opportunities are bought. The optimal allocation of wealth maximizes
Dene the utility of wealth accordingly by
where a i ∈ {0, 1}. This utility of wealth exhibits several discontinuities at wealth levels at which it is optimal to change the choice of a. Dene the solution of the linear relaxation of the problem (treating the consumption opportunities as if they were perfectly divisible) as
The solution to the latter turns out to be simpler as the greedy algorithm delivers the optimal solution to the relaxed knapsack problem. Proposition 1. The optimal consumption plan for a wealth level w -given that consumption opportunities i ∈ I are perfectly divisible -is described by Vasquez (2017) provides several important insights for this setting. First, at almost all wealth levels w < w * ι there is an incentive to gamble asŪ(w) > U (w).
Simultaneously, there is a willingness to pay for insurance. Consider wealth levels w 1 , w 2 with w 1 < w * i < w 2 for some i ≤ ι and consider the gamble (w 1 , p; w 2 , 1 − p)
. If, at the outset, the individual faces an undesirable lottery with expected wealth above a threshold w * i , i ≤ ι and some wealth realizations below said threshold, that individual seeks to rid itself of this undesirable risk by buying insurance. Afterwards, unless the certain wealth equals exactly one of the thresholds w * i , the individual seeks to acquire a desirable risk that incorporates wealth realizations at thresholds w * i . Second, the desire to gamble and/or insure are independent of the marginal utility of wealth U (w) that is 1 (almost) everywhere.
Third,Ū(w) is concave. Hence, if a person already possesses an optimal wealth distribution, i.e., the person holds a wealth lottery W = (w * i , p; w * i+1 , 1 − p) with expected value w, then that person rejects any further gamble.
The analyses by Ng (1965) , Jones (2008) , and Vasquez (2017) already show that with indivisibilities in consumption, people cannot be classied as risk-averse/riskseeking in the sense that for any lottery, they prefer the expected value of that lottery to the lottery itself or vice versa. 4 With indivisible consumption opportunities, some lotteries are desirable, others are not. Hence, people's risk attitudes are more nuanced than seeing all risk as either bad or good. There is, however, no reason to believe that consumption opportunities -more specically their value v i and their cost c ishould be the same in all states. If they dier across states, the (indirect) utility associated with a particular wealth level must also vary across states. This links the idea of indivisibilities in consumption to the literature on state-dependent preferences. Notably, this literature oers another reason why risk attitudes are more complex than the typical risk aversion/ risk love dichotomy. If marginal utility of wealth diers across states, it is optimal to deviate from an equal distribution of wealth across states.
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To distinguish the analysis of state-dependent indivisibilities from the literature on irreplaceable commodities, I maintain the assumption that marginal utility from divisible consumption is state-independent. knapsack utility function. However, this is due to his implicit assumption of u d (w) = 0. Here, the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion is well-dened almost everywhere. However, it remains meaningless for understanding risk attitudes. Given that we are not interested in the identity of the consumption opportunities that are optimally consumed at a particular wealth level, but in the shape of the utility function that results from optimal consumption, I assume that in each state s consumption opportunities are ordered according to density. This means that i (s) refers to the indivisible consumption opportunity that has the i-highest density in state s, while I suppress the dependence whenever this is possible.
Dene the state-dependent utility function over wealth as
where a i(s) ∈ {0, 1}. Dene the solution of the linear relaxation of the problem as
be the expected utility of consuming wealth w optimally in each state s ∈ S and letŪ(w) = s∈S p sŪs (w). As before,
In this environment, it can be optimal to transfer wealth across states s in order to realize opportunities with large densities d i that only occur in a particular state and are not feasible or desirable in this state given the current allocation of wealth.
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It is easy to see that it is only a highly special case that the optimal allocation of wealth across states s is an equal distribution. Thus, people cannot be considered risk-averse.
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Similar to the case of state-independence, insurance can be viewed as a means to transfer wealth into states in which wealth achieves a larger increase in utility. Under state-independence, dierences in wealth are the only possible reason for such a transfer to be desirable. In the context of state-dependence, wealth transfers across states are desirable even without any risk in wealth. Thus, state-dependence requires a dierent understanding of insurance. It is no longer solely a means to decrease risk exposure, but a means for directed wealth transfers across states. Denition 1. Insurance is a targeted transfer of wealth across states in order to address conditional needs.
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Gambling thus diers from insurance in that the identity of the states, in which the dierent realizations of the lottery occur, do not matter. In contrast, insurance can be understood as a targeted redistribution of wealth across states of which the identity matters. This denition diers from previous ones in that it no longer regards insurance solely as a tool to rid the decision-maker of risk. This is still possible under the above denition: if marginal utility of wealth is not constant in wealth, then redistributing wealth from states with higher wealth into states with lower wealth constitutes insurance according to the above denition, because marginal utility is a measure of needs addressed through the consumption of divisible consumption opportunities. A larger marginal utility (compared to other states) thus reects a larger conditional need. In addition, the above denition allows insurance to be a tool to acquire desirable risks that redistribute wealth into states in which the DM reaps a larger utility from wealth even if these states are not characterized by a lower wealth level in comparison to other states. Longevity risk presents a nice example. Living longer than expected does not constitute a loss in wealth. If at all, it constitutes a positive shock to lifetime wealth as it prolongs earnings potential. However, given that the need for (and thus utility of) money is arguably larger in the state in which one is alive, there is a desire to transfer wealth into the state in which this need occurs. Insurance against longevity risk is thus an insurance that exposes us to more risk in our wealth distribution. This is desirable, however, as it allows us to acquire a desirable risk. The existence of state-dependent preferences thus either requires to redene certain forms of insurance as gambling; or it requires us to give up the idea that insurance is solely a means to rid oneself of risk. I argue for the latter. Gambling, in contrast, always means an increase in the risk of one's wealth distribution.
What is the maximal utility that can be derived from directed wealth transfers, i.e., insurance? Letw = (w s ) s∈S be a distribution of wealth across states s ∈ S and Ew its expected value. Dene
as the maximal utility from insuring. It is clear that
the expected utility of a given wealth level that is identically distributed across states s ∈ S while U I (w) is the utility that is attainable by optimally distributing wealth w across states s ∈ S. It derives from transferring wealth optimally across states given the consumption opportunities that present themselves in each state, and thus, the conditional needs that an individual faces.
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However, neitherŪ (w) nor U I (w) constitute the maximum utility of wealth at-
Clearly, U * (w) ≥Ū (w) by the same argument as U I (w) ≥ U (w). In addition,
Hence, U * (w) is the maximum expected utility that can be derived from a wealth level w. It is achieved by optimally distributing wealth across states s ∈ S given that in each of these states the DM gambles optimally with the allocated wealth w s to achieve a wealth level w * i(s)
.
It is important to recognize that both insurance and gambling are used here to achieve an unequal distribution of wealth across states of nature. Hence, if (and only if ) U * (w) > U(w), then the DM prots from assuming particular risks and is, thus, not risk-averse. Note that U * (w) = U (w) holds only at wealth levels w ≥ max s∈S w ι(s)
9 The case of state-dependent preferences reveals a common misconception about insurance. People buy insurance to address conditional needs, and not to mitigate losses. While losses can be the source of greater needs, the occurrence of a loss is not necessary for insurance to be desirable. 15 and at wealth levels at which w = w * i(s) for all states s ∈ S. Thus, even didence, the dislike of all mean-zero lotteries at a specic wealth level w, is a highly special case.
It is informative to investigate dierences between U (w), U I (w),Ū (w), and U * (w).
Dierences between the rst and the following two indicate gains from insuring and gambling, respectively. Positive dierences between U * and both U I andŪ indicate a gain from both gambling and insurance if there are also strictly positive dierences between U I ,Ū , and U (w).
Example 2. Consider two equiprobable states s 1 , s 2 . There is one indivisible consumption opportunity v = 8, c = 6 that is available in both states, and another indivisible consumption opportunity with v = 8, c = 4 that is unique to state s 2 . Suppose there is also a utility loss of 10 associated with state 2. 10 Figure 2 depicts the setup. 10 The utility loss is of no importance for behavior as such a shock simply shifts the utility function. Its sole purpose is distinguish the state-dependent utility functions more clearly in the following gure.
Consider the wealth level w = 3. At this level of wealth, none of the indivisible consumption opportunities is aordable. Hence, U 1 (3) = 3, U 2 = 3 − 10 = −7, and U (3) = 0.5 * 3 + 0.5 * (−7) = −2. At w = 3, there is a gain from gambling. Consider the wealth lottery W = (4, 0.75; 0, 0.25) with EW = 3. Taking the gamble yields the expected utility ofŪ(3) = −0.5 > U(3). However, it is even better to insure than to gamble. Consider the insurance contract that transfers one unit of wealth from state 1 to state 2.
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Buying such a contract yields the utility U I (3) = 0 >Ū (3) > U(3). It is strictly better to insure rather than to gamble because insurance allows to transfer the one unit of wealth that is required to aord the indivisible good in state 2 directly from state 1. In contrast, the gambler must hope for the coincidence of winning the gamble when state 2 occurs. It is possible to show that U I (3) < U * (3), i.e., that there is an even better way to allocate wealth than to solely insure. Consider the following combination of insurance and gambling: the individual buys a lottery ticket that pays a prize of 3 with probability 1/3 at a cost of −1. This yields the wealth lottery W = (5, ). Conditional on winning the lottery, he buys insurance that transfers 1 unit of wealth from state 2 to state 1. Conditional on losing the lottery, he buys insurance that transfers 2 units of wealth from state 1 to state 2. This yields U I (2) in case of losing and U I (5) in case of winning. In expectation, this yields a utility of U * (3) = 1 3 > U I (3). Hence, the maximum utility can be reached through a combination of insurance and gambling.
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The above example illustrates that an individual can be willing to both gamble and insure even if the initial endowment is certain. In addition, it shows that gambling and insurance are far from opposite behaviors but may sometimes complement each other. 11 The insurance pays a benet of 2 in case state 2 occurs and requires a premium payment of 1. 12 This requires either that insurance activity can be conditioned on the outcome of gambling or that gambling activity can be conditioned on the resolution of states s ∈ S. In the latter case, U * (3) = 1 3 can be attained by transferring 1 unit of wealth from state 1 to state 2 through insurance, and, if state 1 occurs, using the remaining wealth for lottery tickets that pay a prize of 6. If a conditioning is not possible, U * (w) = max U I (w),Ū (w) . 
(9)
The equation shows why insurance is particularly valuable if state s is rather improbable. If p s is low, then it requires only a small transfer x from states s = s to allow a large increase in wealth in state s. This helps to nance consumption opportunities exclusive to state s that have large cost, but also large gains, associated with them.
Proposition 2. Suppose that at wealth level w, there exists an indivisible consumption
Although Proposition 2 only states a sucient condition for insurance to be desirable, it is worthwhile pointing out how weak this condition is. It requires that the decision-makers optimal allocation includes some divisible consumption in every state s ∈ S. Then, all that is required for insurance to be valuable is that there exists an indivisible consumption opportunity in some state s, that is not already consumed and of which the actuarially fair premium is aordable out of divisible consumption. This also suggests a possible source of complementarity between gambling and insurance. From Proposition 2, we know that insurance is desirable as soon as the fair premium of insurance is aordable out of divisible consumption. Note, however, that the fair premium of insurance is itself a state-independent indivisible expense, and we know from previous work (Ng 1965; Jones 2008; Vasquez 2017 ) that gambling is desirable to nance exactly those expenses. That means, if the fair premium that is required to nance a state-dependent consumption opportunity across state via insurance is not aordable, but some money is invested in divisible consumption,
it is optimal to gamble for the money that is needed to pay the fair premium. A complementarity between insurance and gambling thus arises from gambling allowing to aord insurance out of divisible consumption.
Desirability of insurance for risk reduction and of gambling for risk increase
While insurance is desirable to achieve the optimal distribution of wealth across states s ∈ S, it retains its traditional value in reducing risk unrelated to the states s ∈ S.
This underlines that the novel denition actually constitutes an extension of the original denition. Given that not all risks are related to states s ∈ S that dier in needs, it is important to understand the risk attitudes unrelated to S that the model predicts.
Suppose that initial wealth is uncertain. More specically, suppose that wealth is a random variable W with expected value w: EW = w and the realizations of W Proposition 3. Low-probability, large-stakes gambles Consider any wealth level w : w < w < w γ . The DM rejects all mean-zero gambles with a gain G <w − w and a loss L > w − w. The DM is willing to take any mean-zero gamble with a gain G ≥w − w and a loss
Proposition 3 shows that people are willing to take gambles if they oer a longshot chance at a large gain and are reluctant to take gambles if they imply a long-shot chance at a large loss. Such behavior -that shows an aversion to risks with a small probability of a large loss and an inclination to take risks with a low probability of a large gain -has so far been attributed to probability weighting (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) . The model oers a rational underpinning for such long-shot risk attitudes.
Further remarks on gambling and insurance and the inappropriateness of borrowing to address indivisibilities
The following example serves two purposes. First, it illustrates a commonality in the motives underlying gambling and insurance that results in the relationship between gambling and insurance to be more complex than just being direct opposites as the traditional view of insurance suggests, or always being complements as in example 2. Second, it is helpful to address a popular objection by Bailey et al. (1980) that local convexities in the utility function remain inconsequential if the decision-maker has access to borrowing and saving.
Example 3. Consider two equiprobable states s 1 , s 2 . There is one indivisible consumption opportunity v = 8, c = 4 that is available in both states, and another indivisible consumption opportunity with v = 8, c = 6 that is unique to state s 2 . Suppose there is also a utility loss of 10 associated with state 2. Figure 3 depicts the setup. 
That is, gambling and insurance yield the same expected utility.
That is, while gambling yields a utility gain, the larger utility gain is reached by insuring.
Example 3 illustrates that gambling is desirable for nancing state-independent indivisible consumption opportunities (Ng 1965; Jones 2008; Vasquez 2017) . If it is possible to nance the same consumption opportunity through a directed wealth transfer (w ≥ 2), then directed wealth transfers and undirected wealth transfers (gambling) are perfect substitutes. This is true because the consumption opportunity that is optimal to consume at w = 4 does not represent a conditional need, but an unconditional one. In a strict sense, a targeted wealth transfer across states is then no longer insurance, as it does not derive its value from addressing a conditional, but an unconditional need. Note also, that the targeted transfer into state 2 is only a perfect substitute for insurance as long as w ≥ 2. If 0 < w < 2, then insurance is no substitute at all. In sum, the purpose of gambling is to nance state-independent consumption opportunities, with insurance being a possible substitute. In contrast, if there is a conditional need -a consumption opportunity exclusive to a state -then a directed wealth transfer through insurance is desirable, with gambling only constituting an imperfect substitute.
Notably, in neither case, gambling constitutes the opposite of insurance, but an (im)perfect substitute for it. This is due to a commonality in the motives underlying gambling and insurance.
As suggested in Fels (2017b), both gambling and insurance can serve as means to nance indivisible consumption opportunities across states. Gambling is useful in nancing state-independent consumption opportunities, while insurance is useful in nancing consumption opportunities that are exclusive to particular states.
Example 3 is also useful to discuss a common critique of considering indivisibilities in consumption. As Bailey et al. (1980) point out, local convexities in the utility function as suggested by Friedman and Savage (1948) might be inconsequential if individuals have access to borrowing and saving opportunities at suciently low cost.
The basic argument suggests that instead of gambling it is better to attain the wealth levels w * i by adjusting wealth temporally, e.g., by reducing consumption in one period to a lower level w * i < w and increasing consumption to a higher wealth level w > w * i+1 in a later period. This is a valid criticism, but hinges on two implicit assumptions.
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First, it implicitly assumes that the wealth levels w * i , w * i+1 neighboring w are actually feasible trough saving and/or borrowing. This is not always the case. Consider the setup in Example 3 in a simple two-period model. Let a superscript t = 1, 2 denote the time period. The DM maximizes U 1 (w 1 ) + βU 2 (w 2 ) where β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the discount factor. Suppose that the individual has wealth level w t = 1 in both periods associated with expected utility −4(1 + β). By borrowing at interest rate r, the individual could reach a wealth level of at most 1 + , but it yields a strictly smaller expected utility as compared to gambling in each periodŪ(1)(1 + β) = −3(1 + β) for any r > 0. In contrast, by saving at interest rate r, the individual could reach a wealth level of at most 2 + r in period 2. As long as r < 2, this yields a utility of β(−3 + r) which is strictly lower than (1 + β)Ū (1). In short, as long as the interest rate does not reach 200%, an individual with wealth level w = 1 is strictly better o by gambling as compared to saving or borrowing. This is due to the fact that saving/borrowing can only redistribute a given lifetime wealth, while gambling can expand it. Intuitively, while it may not be possible to make a million Dollar out of a Dime through saving in a given period of time, it is possible to make a million Dollar out of a Dime through gambling in a rather short period of time (even if the odds are not exactly high).
Second, for borrowing/saving to be a good alternative to nancing indivisibilities, these need to be state-independent. Consider again the setup in Example 3 in a simple two-period model. Suppose that the individual has wealth level w t = 9 in both periods associated with expected utility U (9) + βU (9) = 8(1 + β). Insuring (in both periods) yields 9(1 + β). Suppose that the DM would borrow in order to achieve a wealth of 10 in period 1 at the expense of reducing w 2 by (1 + r). This yields U 1 = U (10) and U 2 = U (8 − r). With r not being too large, this yields a utility of 10 + β(7 − r) , that exceeds the utility from insuring if and only if β ≤ 1/(2 + r). Hence, for borrowing to yield a better outcome, the discount rate must exceed 100%, a rather strong requirement in many settings.
14 Suppose, in contrast, the individual would save 1/(1 + r) units to achieve the wealth level 10 in period 2. This yields a utility 8 − . Hence, for saving to be better than insurance would require a negative discount rate. In sum, for saving/borrowing to dominate insurance, an extreme dierence between the interest and discount rate is required. Again, the intuition for the superiority of insurance is pretty simple. Saving and borrowing reallocate wealth across time. The optimal realization of state-dependent indivisible consumption opportunities, however, requires reallocation across states of nature. Proposition 4. In any state s ∈ S, the optimal consumption plan for a wealth level w -given that consumption opportunities i ∈ I(s) are perfectly divisible -is described
It is optimal to allocate an incremental unit of wealth into divisible consumption if the marginal utility of doing so exceeds the density d i of any indivisible object with a i < 1. That is, if an amount w d of wealth is allocated into divisible consumption it must be true thatā i = 1 for all indivisibles with
The utilityŪ s (w) resulting from such an allocation can again be interpreted as the utility from gambling optimally in state s given wealth w. It constitutes the concave envelope of U s (w) withŪ s (w) ≥ U s (w).Ū s is a concave function alternating between strictly concave and linear parts. In contrast, U s (w) exhibits several jump discontinuities in its rst derivative.
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At these discontinuities, the right derivative of U s (w) exceeds the left derivative. This is intuitive as the indivisibilities in consumption result in too much wealth being allocated into divisible consumption until a threshold wealth is realized that allows to optimally invest into the indivisible consumption opportunities. This is an important consequence of indivisibilities: the marginal utility of wealth U s (w) is not monotonically decreasing even if the utility from divisible consumption is (compare Ng 1965 
The proposition shows how indivisibilities in consumption cause marginal utility of wealth to dier across states, resulting in incentives to reallocate wealth into states with unique indivisible consumption opportunities even at wealth levels at which these opportunities have already been realized.
The following example illustrates that dierences in marginal utility across states at a wealth level w are still a sucient but no longer a necessary requirement for insurance to be desirable. In the above example, a single state-dependent consumption opportunity results in marginal utility of wealth to dier across states for any wealth level above a threshold w i . However, insurance is already valuable for wealth levels at which it is worthwhile to pay the actuarially fair premium: w ≥ w I i . This illustrates how indivisibilities can (a) cause marginal utilities to dier across states, and (b) that, since they cause marginal utility to no longer be monotonically decreasing, there is an insurance value even for wealth levels at which marginal utilities do not dier (yet).
Example 4 also illustrates a crucial dierence between indivisibilities in consumption and consumption commitments (Chetty and Szeidl 2007) . Both produce a similar shape in the utility function with adjoining concave parts and local convexities at the points where the concave parts meet. However, the largest utility attainable with consumption commitments is the utility associated with optimal gambling over wealth U (w). In contrast, if these local convexities are the result of state-dependent indivisible consumption opportunities, insurance can yield a larger utility gain exactly in the region of local convexity. While the two models make similar predictions with respect to the shape of the utility function U (w), they make dierent predictions about the optimal behavior as they attribute a dierent cause to the local convexities in the 27 utility of wealth.
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Dene
is the amount of wealth at which it becomes optimal to purchase opportunity i in state s rather than spend the amount c i(s) on divisible consumption. By the strict concavity of u d , it is optimal to equalize the impact of nancing opportunity i(s) across states:
This again implies that there exists a wealth level w
, implicitly dened by
as of which it becomes optimal to nance indivisibility i(s) across states. 
This directly implies that lim ps→0 w
The less likely the state s, in which the consumption opportunity opportunity arises, the more insurance is able to overcome the indivisibility problem associated with the consumption opportunity. This is intuitive. As p s → 0, the premium payment that is required to nance opportunity i(s) becomes negligible. In the limit, all it needs is a marginal reduction in divisible consumption in all states. Such a marginal reduction is worthwhile as soon as u d (w) reaches d i , which -by denitionis atŵ i .
16 Note that the behavioral predictions are identical if the kink in the utility function is produced by an indivisible consumption opportunity that is state-independent. is a strictly concave/strictly convex function.
Note that if dierences in marginal utility across states result from indivisibilities in consumption, there is still a consumption-smoothing motive despite a dierence in marginal utility across states. It applies to the divisible part of consumption, not overall consumption. It is only if marginal utility from divisible consumption also diers across states, that there is no consumption-smoothing motive. It is important to recognize the dierence between the consumption-smoothing value of insurance that is derived from nancing a consumption opportunity across states and the traditional consumption-smoothing value of insurance to address losses in wealth. First, the expense of c i in state s is a deliberate choice, not an exogenous event. This is most obvious for wealth levels w < w I i . At these wealth levels, the DM is not willing to make the expense c i in state s even if nanced across states. At wealth levels w I i < w < w i , the DM is willing to make the expense only if it is nanced across states, and, thus, only if consumption-smoothing through insurance is feasible. At wealth levels w ≥ w i , the DM is willing to make the expense c i even by nancing it within state s, but prefers to smooth the expense across states. Thus, the consumptionsmoothing motive is based on the desire to optimally nance a conditional need, not to cover a loss.
Second, at wealth levels w ∈ w I i(s) , w i(s) , opportunity i(s) is only consumed if consumption-smoothing through insurance is available. Hence, the purpose of insurance is to increase consumption in the state s. This contradicts the notion that any increase in consumption of the insured asset/service is a sign of moral hazard that depresses the value of insurance. On the contrary, the increase in consumption is the basis of insurance value for some wealth levels. This idea is related, but not identical, to a proposition by De Meza (1983) and to the access motive of Nyman (1999) further discussed below.
18 It is similar to Nyman's idea that insurance might exactly be valuable for increasing consumption of the insured asset/service (benecial moral hazard). The access motive posits that the insured asset is not consumed without insurance because consumption is not feasible (w < c i ). Here, the insured service i(s)
is not consumed because the opportunity cost in terms of divisible consumption is too large if the service is only nanced within state s, but bearable if nanced out of the divisible consumption of all states. That is, it is only through consumption-smoothing that the consumption opportunity is worthwhile at some wealth levels.
Beyond a consumption-smoothing motive, there can be an additional value in
In such a case, a decision-maker would prefer to spend his rst units of wealth on indivisible consumption, but is not able to do so until w ≥ c i . Nyman (1999) Figure 4 depicts the utility functions. Nyman (2003, p. 67 .) does not distinguish the two values and considers only the entire value of insurance in case it provides access. 31 as the cost of paying c i is minimized by equalizing the payment across states.
For all wealth levels, w I i ≤ w < c i , there exists an additional access value as insurance allows the consumption of opportunity i at wealth levels at which paying c i is not feasible:
where x = ps 1−ps (c − w) is the necessary wealth transfer from states s = s into state s that allows to pay c i in state s. Note that the access value is not necessarily positive.
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To date, most economic analysis of insurance and policy recommendations with respect to its ecient design focus on the consumption-smoothing value of insurance.
The following proposition indicates that this focus might neglect the major part of insurance value. Proposition 7. (i) Given w < c i , the access value of insurance exceeds its consumptionsmoothing value if and only if (ii) For p s → 0, the access value exceeds the consumption smoothing value if and only 21 To see this, simply assume that ).
The access value exceeds the consumption-smoothing value if the expected consumer surplus from buying the good at wealth w = c i exceeds both the loss of redistributing w across states such that c i is feasible and the gain from equalizing the disutility of paying c i across states. Note that the former is a rst-order eect, although an uncertain one, while the other two are certain second-order eects that depend on the curvature of u d . This suggests that insurance directed at nancing high-cost (c i ), but also high-value expenditures (v i ) derives its major value from providing access. This corroborates the suggestion by Nyman (1999) that the major value of health insurance may lie in providing access instead of its consumption-smoothing role. It extends this hypothesis to any insurance that covers assets of particularly high value and cost.
Above analysis shows that the dierent functions of insurance -consumptionsmoothing and access value -are not mutually exclusive. A simple model with statedependent indivisibilities allows to derive an insurance model that nests both purposes of insurance. This, again, can be the basis of an informed discussion of their relative contribution in dierent insurance contexts.
5 Conclusion
The existence of state-dependent indivisible consumption opportunities has a decisive impact on people's risk attitudes.
First, it produces a state-dependence of preferences over wealth that rule out the classic trichotomy of risk aversion, risk neutrality, and risk love. In general, risk aversion is conned to be an extremely special case.
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In general, people have more nuanced attitudes regarding some risks as desirable and others -with similar distributional characteristics -as undesirable. This requires a redenition of what constitutes insurance. Insurance must be viewed as a means for directed wealth transfers instead of a means for risk reduction. The novel denition of insurance questions the standard view of insurance and gambling as opposite activities. Instead, the two activities have a far more nuanced relationship depending on the situation, ranging from being complements to being imperfect substitutes. Second, state-dependent indivisibilities are a possible root cause of variations in the marginal utility of wealth across states, suggesting a link between the literature on indivisible consumption and state-dependent preferences. Finally, indivisibilities in consumption result in insurance to be desirable for two purposes: consumption-smoothing and access. The consumption-smoothing motive does not result from the intent to mitigate a loss, but is based on a desire to minimize the opportunity cost of nancing a state-dependent indivisible consumption opportunity. Beyond the motive to equalize marginal utility of wealth, insurance may create an access value (Nyman 1999) . I show that the access motive presents the major value of insurance if insurance serves the purpose to nance a major state-dependent indivisible consumption opportunity. 22 More precisely, didence -the dislike of any mean-zero lottery -is conned to a limited number of wealth levels. This rules out risk aversion which requires didence at all wealth levels (Gollier 2001) . Risk aversion is then the special case that describes the non-existence of any state-dependent indivisible consumption opportunities, nor any other source of state-dependence of utility.
These ndings have important implications for policy and future research. First, optimal insurance design should no longer be based on the assumption that people are risk averse. Instead, it should focus on the degree to which insurance covers the conditional needs that it is supposed to address. 23 Second, empirical studies seeking to recover risk attitudes from insurance choices cannot be generalized to settings outside the domain in which they were conducted. There is no longer a theoretical reason why risk preferences should be stable across contexts. Third, laboratory studies that seek to elicit risk preferences might have little explanatory power with regard to actual insurance choices. Frequent ndings of risk averse choices may say more about the general desirability of the typical risks oered in laboratory experiments than about a general risk attitude.
